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RECOGNIZING THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS IN
 
DEVELOPING COST AND RETURNS STATEMENTS*
 
Government programs have important, often unrecognized, 
effects on both costs and returns for many commodities. These 
effects range from obvious ones such as deficiency payments for 
wheat and corn, to more subtle ones such as implicit subsidies 
for irrigation water or agricultural assessments that reduce real 
estate taxes. It is clearly difficult to disentangle and 
correctly identify these effects, but as analysts we should 
surely make some effort to recognize them. These efforts should 
be quantitative whenever possible, but at least qualitative for 
the important ones which seem to defy consistent procedures for 
measurement. This is particularly important in making 
comparisons across production regions where different cost 
structures may apply. 
At the outset, it is also important to salute the 
consistent, careful work of economists at ERS in their annual 
efforts since 1973 to meet the mandates of Congress in preparing 
annual estimates of production costs for key commodities by 
region across the United states. These have provided a national 
frame of reference for nearly all discussions of production costs 
for individual commodities. Methods used have been clearly 
identified; we have all benefitted from ERS efforts on these 
basic annual series. 
Effects of Government Programs on Returns 
Government commodity programs clearly have important effects 
on farmers' planting and harvest decisions. These programs 
influence both production and prices, and hence both gross and 
net farm incomes. The aggregate level of direct government 
payments to farmers over the last two decades is indicated in 
Table 1. As a proportion of total cash farm receipts in the 
United states, payments are a relatively small part, in most 
years less than 10 percent of the total. But for major program 
commodities they are much more significant. The cover 
illustration of the December 1990 Agricultural Income and Finance 
situation and Outlook Report, Figure 1, provides current 
perspective for food grains, feed grains, and cotton where as 
much as 30% of the total come from government payments. 
...
 
*This paper was prepared for presentation at a national 
conference on "Economic Accounting for Commodity Costs and 
Returns," February 20-21, 1991, sponsored by the Farm Foundation, 
The Economic Research Service, Federal Extension Service, and the 
American Agricultural Economic Association. 
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Table 1.	 Direct Government Payments to Farmers 
Major Programs, United states, 1970-89 
Feed All 
Year Grains Wheat Cotton Other Total 
- Million Dollars ­
1970 $1,504 $ 871 $ 919 $ 423 $ 3,717 
1971 1,054 878 822 391 3,145 
1972 1,845 856 813 448 3,962 
1973 1,142 474 718 273 2,607 
1974 101 70 42 317 530 
1975 279 77 138 313 807 
1976 196 135 108 295 734 
1977 187 887 130 614 1,818 
1978 1,172 963 127 768 3,030 
1979 494 114 185 583 1,376 
1980 382 211 172 520 1,285 
1981 243 625 222 843 1,933 
1982 713 652 800 1,327 3,492 
1983 1,346 864 662 6,424 * 9,296 
1984 367 1,795 275 5,994 * 8,431 
1985 2,861 1,950 1,106 1,788 7,705 
1986 5,158 3,500 1,042 2,114 11,814 
1987 8,490 2,931 1,204 4,122 16,747 
1988 7,219 1,842 924 4,495 14,480 
1989 3,140 603 1,184 5,947 10,874 
*PIK payments not distributed to individual crops. 
Source: ERS, ECIFS 8-1. 
-
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In a state such as North Dakota, where government programs 
are particularly important, the impact of direct payments is more 
readily evident. The 1987 Census of Agriculture collected data 
on government payments and market sales and summarized the 
effects of including payments with sales on size distributions in 
Volume 2, Part 5. The effect of including government payments 
along wi~~ market sales on changes in the size distributions is 
presenteJ in tables 2 and 3. On farms where deficiency payments 
were received for most of the crops produced, the effects on 
gross income were important. Often they turned what would have 
been negative net incomes into positive ones. 
Table 2. Impact of Adding Government Payments
 
to Market Sales on
 
Size Distribution of Farms, North Dakota, 1987
 
Number of Farms 
Sales Plus 
Market Government 
Size Class Sales Only Payment Difference 
- Farm Numbers -
$1,000,000 
500,000 
250,000 
100,000 
50,000 
or more 
- 999,999 
- 499,999 
- 249,999 
- 99,999 
46 
200 
846 
4,855 
7,808 
53 
264 
1,270 
6,646 
8,414 
+ 7 
+ 64 
+ 424 
+1,791 
+ 606 
(+2,892) 
25,000 - 49,999 
10,000 - 24,999 
5,000 - 9,999 
2,500 - 4,999 
Less than 2,500 
7,725 
6,817 
2,982 
1,750 
2,260 
7,120 
5,810 
2,444 
1,376 
1,892 
605 
-1,007 
538 
374 
368 
(-2,892) 
Total Farms 35,289 35,289 
Source: Census of Agriculture, 1987, Volume 2, Part 5. 
-
.. 
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Table 3. Impact of Adding Government Payments 
to Market Sales on 
Total Values by size Class, North Dakota, 1987 
Total Value 
Sales Plus 
Market Government 
Size Class Sales Only Payment Difference 
- Millions of Dollars­
$1,000,000 
500,000 
250,000 
100,000 
50,000 
or more 
- 999,999 
- 499,999 
- 249,999 
- 99,999 
$ 213.2 
279.4 
714.6 
554.1 
$ 89.8 
177.1 
420.2 
993.1 
605.4 
$+ 53.7 
+140.8 
+278.5 
+ 51. 3 
25,000 
10,000 
­
-
49,999 
24,999 
280.8 
115.4 
262.6 
99.4 
- 18.2 
-
16.0 
5,000 - 9,999 
2,500 - 4,999 
Less than 2,500 
21.8 
6.5 
2.3 
18.1 
5.1 
1.9 
3.7 
1.4 
0.4 
Total Value 2,188.2 2,672.8 +484.6 
Source: Census of Agriculture 1987, Volume 2, Part 5. 
Consistent Treatment in Cost and Returns Statements 
Cost and returns statements for wheat and peanuts are both 
included in the annual pUblication, Economic Indicators of the 
Farm Sector: Costs of Production. In the case of wheat the gross 
value of production is estimated based on harvest month market 
prices; the value of secondary products, such as straw, is 
included as well. Since 1986 (ECIFS 6-1) it has been explicitly 
noted that direct government payments are excluded from the 
estimate of gross value of production. 
In the case of peanuts, procedures followed are the same as 
those for all of the other grains and oilseeds. Yet, there is 
­
one strikingly different result in the final economic 
calculation, "residual returns to management and risk" (Table 4). 
There is a large positive value per acre for peanuts, unlike all 
those calculated for the other grain crops. 
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Table 4. Residual Returns to Management and Risk 
ERS Cost of Production statements, 1985-87 
Residual Returns to Management and Risk 
Crop 1985 1986 1987 
- Dollars Per Planted Acre -
Corn $- 24 $­ 73 $­ 51 
Grain Sorghum - 23 - 42 - 39 
Barley 
Oats 
- 42 
- 33 
- 47 
-
50 
- 40 
- 30 
Wheat 
- 29 - 44 - 37 
Rice - 42 -189 -149 
Soybeans 
Sunflower 
4 
- 10 
8 
- 16 
+ 4 
- 17 
Peanuts +148 +177 +124 
Source:	 Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: Costs of 
Production, 1987, ERS/USDA, ECIFS 7-3, February 1989. 
Everyone in this audience, hopefully can explain the reasons 
for the difference. The effects of government programs through 
the imposition of marketing quotas are included in the case of 
peanuts, where a two price system for quota peanuts and 
additional peanuts is in place. The price of quota peanuts is 
about four times the support rate for additional peanuts. This 
government program has worked well in the interest of both 
producers and processors. Interestingly, the annual rental value 
of quota is reported by Schaub to be about $150 per ton, about 
the same as the average of the residual returns to risk and 
management per acre reported in Table 4. 
The reason for dwelling on this comparison, which could be 
explained to the general public by most agricultural economists 
with a little effort, is that the effects of government programs 
on returns is included in one estimate of gross value of 
production (peanuts) but not the other (wheat). If one turns a 
few more pages in ECIFS 7-3 to sugar beet production costs for 
the same years, one finds residual returns to risk and management 
per acre of $100 (1985), $157 (1986), and $236 (1987). It is no 
wonder that stories appeared in the Wall Street Journal, June 26, 
1990, with the headline, "Range War: Small Minnesota Town Is ... 
Divided by Rancor Over Sugar Policies". While the programs for 
sugar beets, which compete with corn and soybeans in some 
locations, are different from peanuts, gross returns per acre are 
even more strongly influenced by government programs although 
direct government payments are not involved. 
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The single, strongest recommendation in this paper is that 
ERS include direct government payments and other quantifiable 
additions to income resulting from government programs when 
estimating gross value of production in their annual cost of 
production reports. Two sets of estimates were developed for 
1988 rice production costs and returns excluding and including 
the effects of government programs (Salassi, et al). Variable 
cash expenses were the same in both estimates. Gross value of 
production per acre was $370 in one case and $596 in the second. 
Fixed costs differed in the two sets of estimates, primarily 
reflecting differences in the way land was valued. Residual 
returns to risk and management increased from $-105 to $+49 per 
acre. 
Included in gross value of production when government 
programs were included were (1) market value, (2) deficiency 
payments, (3) marketing loan proceeds, and (4) haying/grazing on 
ACR acreage. The third item is one of the "additional" benefits 
which may occur when marketing loans are part of government 
programs. All such quantifiable benefits resulting from 
participation in a commodity program should be identified insofar 
as possible as part of the returns statement. ThUS, if corn 
producers consistently benefitted from "PIK and roll" such an 
estimate of the addition to gross value would be warranted. At 
the same time if land is forced to be idled and no crop can be 
harvested because of ARP, the costs associated should be 
recognized in a separate line in the summary statement to 
recognize this effect of government programs as well. 
other Effects on Returns by Government Programs 
Government programs have a direct effect on returns through 
control over supply and hence in market prices (peanuts, sugar 
beets, sugar cane) or through direct payments (food and feed 
grains). In the case of marketing loans there is also the 
difference between the loan rate and the world market price which 
can be received which adds to revenue in years when this occurs. 
with appropriate .... "adjustments made for program yields, the 
basis on which producers are actually paid, program participation 
rates, and payments under the 50/92 program" ... (Salassi) most of 
the quantifiable effects of government programs are considered. 
other effects also exist which are much less easily 
identified in numerical form. Among those commonly cited are 
the depressing effect on market prices of CCC stocks and those in 
the FOR when the market views them as burdensome (Knutson, 
­Gardner). Conversely, quotas and controls on imports for 
commodities like beef and dairy products can have a positive 
effect on prices even when the quantity of imports is small 
relative to domestic production. The major efforts devoted to 
estimating producer subsidy equivalents as part of the data 
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assembled for the GATT Negotiations, have provided evidence for 
both exporting and importing countries of the numerous ways in 
which governments influence both costs and returns in each 
domestic market (Mabbs-Zeno). In an international framework 
quantitative estimates of these separate effects have been made 
using a consistent methodology. 
In my view, it would be useful in national estimates of 
costs and returns for individual commodities to recognize the 
more important of these effects. These can be identified in a 
footnote to the existing tables even if a quantitative estimate 
of their implicit effect on returns cannot be calculated 
systematically. 
Estimates of Fixed and Variable Costs 
Before examining the ways in which government programs have 
direct and indirect effects on costs of production, the following 
assertions about the treatment of fixed and variable costs 
provide my perspective: (1) Valid comparisons can be made across 
regions with respect to variable costs per unit of production. 
(2) Most problems in developing "acceptable" cost statements are 
associated with the assumptions required in estimating and 
allocating fixed costs. (3) Recognition of the influence of 
government programs on capital requirements, land values, and 
production rights, like marketing quotas, must be addressed 
directly if a "full" cost of production statement is desired. 
Variable Costs. In the view of this analyst, it is variable 
costs that deserve the most care and attention in collecting 
information on costs of production. These are the out-of-pocket 
costs over which short-run production decisions are made. It is 
possible to get comparable information from producers in 
different locations and situations for a given technology. It is 
even possible to make comparisons on variable costs across 
national boundaries. For many producers, the difference between 
gross value of production and variable costs, excluding cash 
rent, is the number that deserves special study. This is what is 
left over to cover fixed costs, overhead, depreciation and pay 
for the use of family labor, capital, land, and management. If 
consistent estimates of gross margin, or alternatively value of 
production less cash expenses (interest payments on real estate 
may confound these results), useful comparisons between years and 
regions can be made. 
•Fixed Costs. Despite 100 years of making estimates of
 
production costs in Europe, North America and Asia, agricultural
 
economists have not yet agreed on a standard way to calculate and
 
then allocate fixed costs to individual enterprises. The
 
approaches to this problem from both accounting and economics are
 
commonly mixed together. The opportunity cost principle and
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market prices get priority in most calculations. Yet, accounting 
rules and conventions remain important parts of most estimation 
procedures because better alternatives have not been developed to 
handle depreciation, charges for management, and interest on 
family contributions of capital. 
Expected future benefits associated with the rights to 
produce, such as an acreage allotment or a marketing quota, are 
quickly capitalized into a value either associated with land or 
the production right itself. Thus, annual rent for one ton of 
quota peanuts is about $150, roughly 25% of the sale price. 
Marketing quotas, when sold, can range in value between $1200 and 
$2000 per ton. In a somewhat more complex, but similar manner, 
expected future benefits from current government programs 
involving target prices, deficiency payments, and loan rates are 
capitalized into land values. Separating the effects of 
government programs on land values from other effects like 
distance from markets, productivity of soils, risk from weather 
related hazards, etc. is difficult or impossible if one seeks 
agreement on how to allocate the contributions to value. 
Nevertheless, most will agree that government programs do have an 
influence on land values even though quantifying that component 
from others is difficult to achieve. 
Special Issues Concerning Costs Resulting from Government 
Programs 
Subsidies. within a national context, if all competing 
producers have equal access to the same production subsidy then 
it can be argued that recognition of that sUbsidy in cost of 
production statements is unnecessary except for international 
comparisons. If, on the other hand, some producers benefit 
sUbstantially while others do not, there is a greater need to 
recognize these differences. Federal and state water projects 
are examples of this kind of issue. As the competing demands for 
water become increasingly strong in the West this will 
necessarily be reflected directly in variable costs. Land values 
and their associated rental rates already reflect the capitalized 
value of "free" access to irrigation water. 
The question posed here is whether water costs, both cash 
and subsidized, should not be recognized as one of the key items 
in variable cost statements for crops where irrigation is 
required. Such action might require a compensating reduction in 
"net land return" or cash rent in the national accounts prepared 
by ERS. Such action would recognize more directly the difference 
-
in variable costs associated with new and old sources of 
irrigation water. -----­
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Acreage Reduction Program. Some cropland must be idled as a 
result of participation in commodity programs. Recognition of 
this cost item should be made explicit for a typical or 
representative producer in the cost statement. Because the ACR 
varies by crop and by year the associated "cost," or income 
forgone from the use of the land resource, can be incorporated as 
a component of the land charge. In principle, the percentage of 
set-aside (15%) could be reflected as 1.15 acres of land charged 
per acre of crop actually produced. This complication, while an 
additional burden in a standard cost of production statement, 
will provide a mechanism to recognize some of the costs as well 
as the addition to income from deficiency payments. 
How far should the effort to account for effects of 
government programs go? with the triple base option in 1991, 
deficiency payments are now denied on an additional percentage of 
the acreage of a program crop. This will be reflected 
automatically in cash deficiency payments received. Likewise 
there will be some cash costs of meeting the conservation 
compliance requirements of the ARP. The rules on payment 
limitations may also have an effect on some of the largest 
operations. Some capital costs may be necessary to meet the 
requirement for having an approved conservation plan in place by 
1995. Insofar as it is feasible to determine the actual cash, or 
their equivalent effects of government programs in a cost and 
returns statement it will make the final product more realistic. 
Pointing out these several influences may also be beneficial to 
both analysts, producers, and policy makers. 
Effects on the Cost and Returns Statement 
One important effort to compare cost and returns statements 
for a crop, rice, where the effects of government programs are 
important, was published by ERS, USDA in 1990 (Table 5). All of 
the detail is not reproduced but the key differences are 
suggested. Value of production is increased primarily by 
deficiency payments and net proceeds from marketing loans. Cash 
expenses differ only by the additional costs of maintaining 
conserving acres. The most important difference among all the 
cost calculations is the calculation for "net land rent" under 
the heading, allocated returns to owned inputs. The rental rate 
of $57.84 contrasts with $121.15 per acre when the effects of 
government programs are included (Salassi). 
-
,. 
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Table 5. Production Costs and Returns: 
With and without Effects of Government Proqrams 
United states, 1988 
without IncludIng 
Description Effects Effect 
- Dollars Per Planted Acre ­
Gross Value of Production: 
Market Value $ 370.33 $ 370.33 
Deficiency Payments 204.03 
Marketing Loan Proceeds 21. 30 
Other .05 
Total Value 
Cash Expenses: 
Variable Cash Expenses 
General Farm Overhead 
Taxes and Insurance 
Interest on Operating Loans 
Interest on Real Estate 
Total Cash Expenses 
Returns Less Cash Expenses 
Capital Replacement 
Returns Less Capital and 
Replacement 
Economic Costs: 
Variable Cash Expenses 
General Farm Overhead 
Taxes and Insurance 
Capital Replacement 
(Subtotal) 
Allocated Returns to Owned 
Inputs:
 
Operating Capital
 
Other Non-land Capital
 
Net Land Rent
 
Unpaid Labor
 
Total Economic Costs 
Residual Returns to 
Management and Risk 
370.33 
296.09 
21. 50 
12.13 
14.04 
9.42 
353.18 
17.15 
46.34 
-29.19 
296.09 
21.50 
12.13 
46.34 
(376.06) 
6.68 
10.86 
57.84 
23.70 
475.14 
-104.81 
595.71 
297.46 
25.05 
14.28 
16.33 
11.18 
364.30 
231.41 
47.49 
183.92 
297.46 
25.05 
14.28 
47.49 
(384.28) 
6.74 
11.15 
121.15 
23.84 
547.16 
48.55 
-

,. .Source:	 Salassi, M. et. ale "Effects of Government Programs on '~ 
Rice Production Costs and Returns, 1988". Agri. Info. 
Bull. 597, March 1990. 
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From my perspective, the statement which includes the 
effects of government programs provides the more realistic 
assessment of conditions facing producers. One could argue that 
the controversial land charge should be handled like capital 
replacement and moved to the first half of the table. Moreover, 
some report of cash rental rates could be provided directly or in 
a footnote. The important point is that the statement including 
the effects of current programs more nearly represents -the 
combination of incentives and disincentives facing producers in 
the field. A cost statement which consciously excludes 
deficiency payments and the costs of conservation compliance, 
leaves out an important part of the cost and returns picture 
facing the industry. 
Summary Comments 
The effects of government programs on both costs and returns 
should be identified and assessed wherever possible in the 
statements prepared annually by ERS. Because the government 
programs change from year to year, the annual statements for corn 
or wheat may not be "comparable" in all respects. But many other 
things of importance change as well including technology, the 
weather, and world supply-demand conditions. Recognizing the 
influences of government programs provides the pUblic and policy 
makers a more accurate and realistic picture of the industry. 
A full assessment of all the ways in which government 
programs affect costs and returns for a given commodity may not 
be possible. But a large share of them can be put in 
quantitative terms just like fertilizer and seed. Certainly 
deficiency payments should be included as part of cash returns 
for food and feed grains if sugar beets and peanuts are evaluated 
at "market" prices. established by the intervention of government 
controlling supply. An effort should be made to evaluate as many 
of the items of costs and returns as possible. If a SUbsidy or 
cost can only be recognized in qualitative terms it is worthy of 
a footnote. In the long run legislators, industry personnel and 
the general pUblic will be served best if these cost and returns 
statements reflect actual conditions as clearly as possible. 
-
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APPENDIX A 
Effect on state Totals by Adding Government Payments to 
Agricultural Sales, Census Data, 1987 
Payments as 
Total Government New Percent of 
state Sales Payments Total Total 
- Billions ­
1. North Dakota $2,188.2 $ 484.6 $2,672.8 18.1 
2. Montana	 1,547.3 232.6 1,779.9 13.1 
3 . Illinois 6,376.8 885.5 7,262.3 12.2 
4. Iowa	 8,926.8 1,153.7 10,080.5 11. 4 
5. Minnesota 5,676.4 712.8 6,389.2 11. 2 
6. South Dakota 2,719.5 313.1 3,032.6 10.3 
7. Indiana	 4,067.7 440.6 4,508.3 9.8 
8. Nebraska 6,667.1 718.2 7,385.3 9.7 
9. Kansas	 6,476.7 573.6 7,050.3 8.1 
10. Michigan 2,545.1 223.5 2,768.6 8.1 
11. Mississippi 1,862.9 159.5 2,022.4 7.9 
12. Ohio	 3,434.1 286.3 3,720.4 7.7 
13. Louisiana 1,340.2 106.8 1,447.0 7.4 
14. Oklahoma 2,714.9 211.2 2,926.1 7.2 
15. Missouri 3,645.0 277.3 3,922.3 7.1 
16. Arkansas 3,320.3 232.4 3,552.7 6.5 
17. Texas	 10,548.9 677.7 11,226.6 6.0 
18. Idaho	 2,269.4 144.6 2,414.0 6.0 
19. Washington 2,919.6 178.0 3,097.6 5.7 
20. Colorado 3,143.1 186.3 3,329.4 5.6 
21. South Carolina 878.7 48.8 927.5 5.3 
22. Wisconsin 4,909.9 256.8 5,166.7 5.0 
23. Tennessee 1,617.6 82.5 1,700.1 4.9 
24. Kentucky 2,075.6 100.4 2,176.0 4.6	 ­
25.	 New Mexico 1,060.1 49.0 1,109.1 4.4 
$92,913.9 $ 8,735.8 $101,649.7 
Other 26 States 43,134.6 910.8 44,045.4 2.1
 
All States 136,048.5 9,646.6 145,695.1 6.6
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APPENDIX B 
Impact of Government Payments on Size Distribution 
Size Distribution of Farms, united states, 1987 
Sales Plus 
Market Government 
Description Sales only Payment Difference 
- Number of Farm ­
$1,000,000 or more 11,093 11,598 + 505 
500,000 - 999,999 20,930 23,360 + 2,430 
250,000 - 499,999 61,148 71,333 +10,185 
100,000 - 249,999 202,550 224,186 +21,636 
50,000 - 99,999 218,050 220,512 + 2,462 
25,000 - 49,999 219,636 219,113 523 
10,000 - 24,999 326,166 320,937 - 5,229 
5,000 - 9,999 274,972 268,654 - 6,318 
2,500 - 4,999 262,918 255,B01 - 7,117 
Less than 2,500 490,296 472,265 -18,031 
Total Farms 2,087,759 2,OB7,759 
-
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APPENDIX C 
Impact of Adding Government Payments
 
to Market sales in
 
size Distribution of Farms, united states, 1987
 
Sales Plus 
Market Government 
Description Sales Only Payment Difference 
- Total Value (billions) ­
$1,000,000 or more $ 37.87 $ 38.73 + 0.86 
500,000 - 999,999 14.08 15.70 + 1. 62 
250,000 - 499,999 20.74 24.22 + 3.48 
100,000 - 249,999 31.18 34.81 + 3.63 
50,000 - 99,999 15.66 15.88 + 0.22 
25,000 - 49,999 7.87 7.87 0.00 
10,000 - 24,999 5.24 5.17 - 0.07 
5,000 - 9,999 1. 96 1.92 - 0.04 
2,500 - 4,999 0.95 0.92 - 0.03 
Less than 2,500 0.50 0.48 - 0.02 
Total Value 136.05 145.70 + 9.65* 
Aggregate government payments, 1987 16.75 
from ERS, ECIFS 8-1. 
-
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